The poultry sector is important for the livelihoods of rural people in China. Under increased public concerns on bio-security, how to integrate the small scale poultry producers into safe and high value production chains is a key political issue in many developing countries. In this context, China initiated a model of building poultry production clusters (PPCs) and moving small producers into the clusters so as to increase the scale of production as well as bio-security. It was considered an innovative model in China and the government issued various policies to promote this model since 2003. However, the model failed after a couple of years of practice. This paper reviews the social, economic and political elements of this endeavor and the impacts of PPCs in China. The main reason for the failure is that, without external authority, the small producers were fated into the dilemma of collection actions, which means that each individual will maximize individual interest with the expense of the public interest. The failure of PPCs supports the previous research results in that as income growth and urbanization increases consumer demand for food safety, the small producers could not meet those high food safety standards and the government has limited capacities to work with millions of small producers to encourage them to follow the same production standards. The political commitment to control transmissible disease outbreaks was given higher priority than the commitment to small producer development since it was difficult for the government to balance the two.
INTRODUCTION
Population expansion, urbanization and income growth in developing countries are fueling a massive global increase in demand for livestock products and has caused a "livestock revolution" in global agriculture that has profound implications for our health, livelihoods and environment (Delgado et al., 1999) . Since livestock makes a significant contribution to economic activity, particularly in agriculture-based and transforming countries, many scholars have raised the question: Can smallholder livestock production systems in developing countries be transformed to take advantage of the increasing demand for livestock products? (e.g. Tarawali et al., 2011) . Some scholars think that the growing demand for livestock products can provide small holders with the opportunities to increase income by expanding production and sales. Livestock production i s considered to be an important pathway out of poverty for the rural poor in developing countries (Kristjanson et al., 2010) . For example, one study shows that the smallholders in Ea Kar District of Vietnam were able to convert from traditional cattle production to efficient market-oriented production and compete successfully in city markets with other suppliers (StÜr et al., 2014) . Others argue that while a growing livestock sector can provide opportunities for the poor, there are deep concerns about the competitiveness and economic viability of the small livestock producers in a rapidly changing livestock sector (McDermott et al., 2010) . Growing resource scarcity, particularly water and land, imply that intensifying livestock production in mixed croplivestock systems in a sustainable way will pose significant social and environmental challenges (McDermott et al., 2010) . Furthermore, animal diseases pose significant threats to livestock sectors throughout the world, both from the standpoint of the economic impacts of the diseases themselves and the measures taken to mitigate the risk of disease occurrence and spread (Perry et al., 2003) . In agriculturally-based economies, people with low and slowly increasing incomes will provide much of the increasing demand for livestock products largely from local, informal and domestic markets (Staal, 2001) . Smallholders are competitive in such local markets. But, will these markets continue to provide growth opportunities for smallholders in the long run as income growth and urbanization increase consumer demand for food safety (McDermott et al., 2010) ? Improving incomes and providing employment to the poor who have limited livelihood options is an important development objective in many developing countries. However, can public policy and related institutions provide a supportive environment for dynamic smallholder-led growth that minimizes negative impacts viable as many of the LPCs were not able to achieve the on the environment and the risks of transmissible intended results. After the failure of LPCs, the China diseases (McDermott et al., 2010) ? government enhanced its efforts to develop large scale Poultry production is an important sector in China's and high standard livestock farms instead of supporting economy. In 2009, China produced 2.54 billion layers the small producers. and 47 billion broilers, accounting for 38.24% and
The LPC policy has had profound impacts on the 14.38% of the total in the world , respectively. Both were livestock production structure and the small producers 1 ranked first and second in the world, respectively. In in China. However, there is no literature in English that 1996, among 234 million small farmers, 104 million analyzes the processes and impacts of LPC policies in households (44%) had poultry operations. Of those China. This paper describes the background, driving farmers who raised poultry, 99.7 percent were small forces, evolution and the effects of government policies producers with a yearly production of 1,000 birds or less.
on Livestock Production Clusters, which will provide an Poultry produced from this huge number of small explanation of the causes for its failure, with a n farmers accounted for about 43 percent of total poultry emphasis on PPCs. The reflections on China's production in China . Therefore, poultry has been an experience to develop PPCs will provide valuable 2 important means of livelihood support for rural lessons on small producer development in the livestock populations in China.
sector for other developing countries. However, since 2004, the unprecedented HighlyPathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in poultry occurred in more than 20 provinces of China. Since then, the Chinese government applied various control measures and initiated higher bio-security requirements for livestock producers. The small scale producers faced various institutional, physical, technical and financial constraints to developing standardized and large scale livestock farms. Rural income growth has been a fundamental goal for Chinese policy makers especially given China's longstanding commitment to reducing rural poverty (Park et al., 2002) . Therefore, the policy makers did not want to see the farmers lose their livelihoods from the poultry sector. The question was, how to integrate the traditional and small scales of production into the high-value and safer livestock value chains in China. To address this problem, China developed a new model for poultry production-the construction of poultry production clusters (PPC)-as a vehicle to drive small producers into intensive and standardized livestock production. A production cluster was given a designated area in rural districts separate from residential areas, where various farm households jointly manage the poultry production. The clusters share the infrastructure such as roads, electricity, water supplies and some of the facilities such as waste treatment facilities. In this way, they can apply standard biological safety measures and environmental-friendly practices. Since 2004, China has issued a series of policies, clauses in laws, circulars and technical standards to promote the development of Livestock Production Clusters (LPCs) covering different types of animals: poultry, pigs, cows, etc. The LPCs developed quickly during this early period and it is estimated that there were over 70,000 LPCs in China by the end of 2006 , 3 though there is no data to show how many of them were PPCs. However, after several years of practice, the policy makers in China realized that the LPC model was not
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Since this study was intended to review the background and impacts of PPC policies in China, a document review and interviews with key informants were applied in this research. The document review analyzed the related government documents and literatures related to this study, so as to understand the social, economic and political background of the policy implementation and the key events in China which have driven the formation and development of PPCs. The documents reviewed include: the policy documents related to PPCs and China's agricultural statistics yearbooks. A number of academic papers by Chinese scholars' related to PPCs were also reviewed to form an analysis from secondary data. The key informant interviews were mainly conducted with the officials in the livestock department of the Ministry of Agriculture. The purpose was to understand the origins and evolution of PPC policies and the rationale of the policy makers to initiate this program.
RESULTS
There were three phases of PPC development in China after the national rural reform in 1978: emergence (late 1980s-2003) , fast development (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) and decline (2008 and after) . In addition, this section analyzes the social, economic and political background of China and the key events that have driven the evolution of PPCs.
Rural reform and the emergency of PPCs (1979-late 1980s): In 1978, frustrated by the failure to raise substantially population living standards after 30 years of socialist revolution, the new political leaders in China shifted the core task of the Communist Party and the national government from the class struggle t o economic development. Recognizing that agriculture was the foundation of the national economy and since 80% of the population lived in rural areas, the government emphasized that the priority task was to poultry together in the designated area, which formed a develop agriculture and increase farmers' income (Lin, PPC. The initial cluster emerged in the late 1980s and 1997). The rural reform adopted the Household gradually spread to all the northern provinces of China, Responsibility System (HRS) to replace the previous which were the main areas of poultry production. This collective production system and contracted the mode was considered to be an improvement over the collective land to individual households for production.
backyard mode and therefore received the bulk o f The reform also loosened the government control of investments from the government and private markets and prices and farmers could trade their enterprises. However, clusters were not developed in surplus products in the free market. The rural reform mass until 2003. was one of the most successful reforms in China. For From 1978 to 1995, the share of livestock in the example, from 1982-1989, the production of poultry and agricultural production value structure in China grew eggs increased from 2.81 million tons to 7.2 million from 15% to 30% . The reason was that the farmers tons, up 156% .
could not make much income from the fragmented and 4
The shift to household responsibility systems gave small pieces of arable land, so that livestock had farmers the freedom to allocate their resources to the become the main income generating source for those most profitable activities based upon their individual households who depended on agriculture to make a competitive advantages. As a result, so-called living. "specialized households" emerged in rural China. They
The poultry sector continued to grow since the initiation focused their resources on one product to make of the rural reform and the poultry and egg production hit commercial production. When they made profits, their a new record of 19.65 million tons in 1996 . In the extended family members, relatives, friends and middle of the 1990s, a critical moment came for the neighbors all learned from them and started to develop poultry sector in China: the supply and demand o f the same product. Poultry raising is a good example of livestock products was balanced and there was n o this development.
longer a shortage of supply in the market. Since then, Gradually, when most of the farm households in the the quantity of poultry production was no longer a n village also raised poultry, this formed the "villages issue. Instead, quality became more and more specialized in poultry". During that time, with the important. At the same time, the poultry sector in China increasing living standards after the reform, the market encountered more challenges. generated a huge demand for poultry products. These
In 1996, another significant event occurred and attracted small commercial producers were very competitive in the serious attention of the government on livestock the market since they mainly used reliable family labour product quality. In April 1996, the EU sent a delegation to and used few purchased inputs. Therefore, they were China to investigate the PPCs in China and they much more competitive than the large farms which were concluded that the poultry meat exported to E U operated by the state or collectives. The large farms contained transmissible diseases, residues from went bankrupt and the majority of the poultry products in chemicals and veterinary medicines and thus Chinese China were supplied by small commercial producers. export was banned to 15 countries of the EU and this During the early period of poultry development after the ban lasted for 5 years. From this event, the government reform, the scale of poultry farms was quite small. For became more conscious of food safety and planned to example, the so-called specialized households only improve the bio-security in the poultry sector. According raised 30-50 chickens, so they had no problems raising to the interview of a senior official from the Ministry of poultry in their backyards. Economic growth after the Agriculture (MOA), "since then, MOA started to think about rural reform generated high demand for meat products how to standardize the PPCs." which caused the shortage of supply in the urban market
In 2000, China entered into the WTO. At that time, in the late 1980s. The farmers were able to make good livestock production had already met the needs of the profits and thus they kept increasing the scale o f domestic market, but had not yet a sufficient access to livestock production. the international market. Therefore, China policy adopted When more and more farmers started to raise poultry in the need to take a greater share of the international the same village and each farm household kept market with the opportunity of entering into WTO. During increasing the scale of production, it produced lots of that time, there was a heated discussion among the waste and unpleasant smells in the village.
government, academics and enterprise leaders on what Furthermore, the farmers were limited by the size of their would be the impacts of WTO on the livestock sector of backyards when they wanted to increase their poultry China and how China should prepare the livestock production. Therefore, in many villages, they were industry to join WTO. The main conclusions were: China allocated a piece of land to rent, such that a group of had the comparative advantages in livestock production producers moved out of the village and produced the and entering into WTO provided China with a good 5 6 opportunity to participate in the international market; existing good practices and scaling them up to the China should make the best use of the opportunities to explore the global market (Lin, 2001; Liu, 2002; Zhao, 2001; Deng, et al., 2003) . To enter into the international market, China had to meet the high technical standards related to bio-security. For example, the EU had thousands of technical standards for foreign exporters. When the majority of the suppliers were small producers, how could they meet those high technical standards? How could the export enterprises control the production behaviors and processes of so many different small suppliers? China's government had to find a way out of this dilemma.
Fast growth of PPCs (2003-2007):
Since 2004, the Avian Influenza (AI) outbreak appeared in more than 2 0 provinces of China, causing the culling of millions of poultry and a significant drop on exports. In 2005, 186,000 poultry died of AI and 22.8 million poultry were culled in China (Jiang, 2006) . Since this disease was also transmissible from animals to humans, the A I outbreak caused top level attention from the government. After analyzing the cases of the AI outbreak in China, it was found that all of the AI outbreak cases happened in small scale commercial poultry producer farms (Jiang, 2006) . The field investigation of the outbreak sites by the government also found the poor bio-security status of the small farmers. In addition, the small producers raised poultry in or near their houses, so that the animals and the humans lived together, which i s believed to be risky in spreading diseases. Therefore, the small producers received lots of criticism during the AI outbreak. Since China has too many poultry for the domestic market and as most of these birds were raised in farmyards, it became very difficult to effectively control diseases. Entry into WTO and the AI outbreak are the two main driving forces behind China's transformation of the livestock sector. The government policy makers made up their minds to transform the traditional way of raising animals. At that time, increasing farmers' income was still the priority political task of the government. During the early 2000s, the stagnant income growth of farmers had become a serious social problem and China's government was trying to make policies to speed up the increase of farmers' income. Therefore, the government needed to keep farmers in the poultry sector instead of driving them out which would further cause the slowing down of farm income generation. However, the government felt that the farmers' traditional ways to raise poultry needed to be standardized, upgraded and modernized. In addition, the animals and the producers needed to be separated. The next problem was how to transform the small producers into modern producers? The policy makers of China had the experience of adopting farmer's national level, such as the case of the household responsibility system. Therefore, the existing PPCs attracted the attention of the policy makers in the Ministry of Agriculture. The policy makers thought that a n advantage of the cluster was that it was located away from the villages with dense populations and thus, it separated animals and human beings. In addition, by putting producers together, the clusters could also have the following potential benefits: 1: It would be easier to require the producers to follow the same procedures and requirements on biosecurity and environmental management 2: It would be more cost-effective to install high standard bio-security facilities, such as the facilities to treat the wastes 3: It would be more convenient for the government to provide technical and financial services to the small farmers in PPCs and monitor for transmissible diseases 4: It would reach the scale of economy in terms of production, so that the farmers could be more competitive in the markets and could get better economic returns Poor technical skills of the producers within PPCs: As Production Capacity", it was stated that actions can some of the producers within the PPCs have not be taken " to guide the areas that meet the relevant attended professional and systematic training courses, conditions in developing LPCs through micro-credit, they cannot organize production in a scientific way and fiscal discount and other means" only operate at a low level of standardization and with 3: In the No.1 Document of CCCPC in 2006 entitled poor management practices. Specifically, they cannot "Opinions on Promoting the Construction of New select and identify the right sprouts, veterinary drugs and Socialist Countryside", it was reiterated that efforts feedstuff in production and often purchase the should be made to encourage the construction of production material of poor quality. They do not make LPCs" epidemic prevention efforts when the livestock do not 4: In the Animal Husbandry Law of China promulgated suffer from diseases and abuse veterinary drugs when on July 1, 2006, it was stated that "the State the livestock are actually affected by diseases. This not supports the rural collective economic only adversely affects the result of epidemic prevention organizations, farmers and livestock cooperative and control, but also impacts the output and quality of economic organizations in building LPCs to operate livestock and livestock products (Ji, 2008) . in a standard and scale-based manner"
The local governments had also responded actively to collect poultry and eggs are often parked near the the policies of the central government on developing clusters, or just stop on the village's roads, which not LPCs. It was estimated that by the end of 2007, there only c auses hidden danger for the spreading o f were about 70,000 LPCs in China (Leng, 2007) .
epidemics, but also affects the transport and causes After several years of rapid growth of PPCs, the expected inconvenience for local people (Ren, 2008) . results have not been achieved due to many constraints. The challenges facing the development of PPCs mainly Lack of coordinated actions in the clusters: In a include the shortage in land, funding and appropriate nutshell, although the government has issued many technology and the difficulty that producers have in taking policies related to the operational practice and joint actions, which made it hardly possible for the construction model of LPCs, these clusters are faced clusters to achieve consistent planning, construction, with a great challenge that it is difficult for many epidemic prevention, pollution treatment, sales and stakeholders to take joint actions. After over 20 years of branding. Specifically, these challenges are: household responsibility systems, the farmer
Nonstandard construction of PPCs:
To build a PPC, a make their own decisions regarding production. They special land allocation in the rural area is required. But may pick up different livestock species and schedule the in reality, it is often very difficult to find such land, whether production at different times, based upon individual for the village or for the producers. As a consequence, forecast on the market demand and family situation the existing PPCs are facing the problems o f (such as labor availability). Therefore, they have different inappropriate site selection, such as the proximity to production schedules or even different animal species main roads and water sources. and they can not perform "all in and all out" policies to
Improper internal layout of the PPCs: PPCs are featured with disorderly internal layout. These problems Declining of PPCs in China: 2008 and onward: After five mainly include too little space and poor ventilation of hen years of practice with PPCs, the government became house and unreasonable design of feeds storage and frustrated by their poor performance and to some extent, other facilities. In addition, while designing the paths, gave up the efforts to integrate the small producers into many clusters have not separated the clean paths which the high value production chain. The PPC was no longer
No entrance control in the PPCs: The vehicles used to households become more and more independent and prevent diseases in the clusters thought to be a viable model for small producer these funds. As a result, the PPC policies have been development. Therefore, there is a tacit agreement converted into policies to support the development of among the government agencies that the PPC was a large scale poultry farms. failure, although there are no official documents t o After the LPC programs, the state government stressed confirm the official view that the PPC model in practice the scale and standardization of the livestock production had failed. Therefore, the national and the local units and tended to assume that the farmers can make government no longer promoted this model. better income by taking migration jobs instead of staying Government officials learned that it is difficult t o in livestock sectors to compete with increasingly bigger coordinate the different producers in a PPC, so it was companies. In the Livestock Development Plan 2011-thought that one PPC should be managed by a single 2015 of China, the target was to increase the proportion producer instead of multiple producers. Then, for the of the large scale farms by 10-15%. government, the large commercial enterprises are the After the LPC program, the small producers were ideal producers for poultry production since they can situated in a disadvantaged position. As disease control afford to invest in high standard bio-security facilities, has become the top priority and it has given political develop larger scale production and hire professional justification to develop large scale poultry farms. veterinary staff. More importantly, the owners of the enterprises can have full control over the clusters, so that they do not have to coordinate with other producers. China's economy has continued to develop after 2008. The contribution from agriculture to GDP kept decreasing, from 30.2% in 1980 to 10.7% in 2008 and 7 the rural population keeps declining due to accelerated urbanization. Since 2010, China implemented a policy on " industry nurturing agriculture" and supported commercial capital to invest in agriculture. The government and private enterprise have more financial capacities to build up the modern and standardized livestock production farms with high levels of biosecurity. With increased public concern on food safety, the customers with greater income increasingly like to pay a premium for high quality and safe food. Many enterprises also realized that agriculture can bring higher and more reliable returns, especially in the sector of high quality agricultural and livestock products. Therefore, many private enterprises entered into agriculture and the livestock sector. For many government officials, introducing enterprises to develop livestock can achieve the high standards, large scale and modernized poultry production and it will be more able to control diseases. It is much easier to manage large enterprises than managing numerous small producers. In addition, attracting enterprises is one of the m ost important performance indicators for local governments. So, no wonder that the government was motivated to attract enterprises to enter the livestock sector and in essence, to replace the millions of small producers. As a result, more and more modern poultry production farms were built up and the small producers were further driven out of the market. Though the government had invested lots of agricultural funds which could be used by farm households, most of these funds have requirements for the scale of production. Therefore, only those bigger farmers, or the enterprises who renamed themselves as farmer cooperatives, can have access to
DISCUSSION
The PPC policy of China was driven by three forces: the first was to access to bigger international markets when China entered the WTO, the second was to control the transmissible animal diseases under AI outbreaks in China and the third was to keep small producers in the poultry sector to maintain their livelihoods under the political commitment to help farmers increase their income. The government of China intended to promote an equal growth in the poultry sector for different producers, with the special consideration in the interests of the small producers. The government expected to make t he PPC model a platform to drive the small producers into standard and scaled production and enhance the bio-security and environmental management. However, the PPC model failed. The main reason for the failure is that though the government gave financial and physical support to build up PPCs, a lack o f organizational support to the group of small producers was fatal. More than 20 years of being independent under the household responsibility system has made farmers lacking in the collective identity and cohesion for effective group management. Without external authority, the small producers were fated into the dilemma of collection actions, which means that each individual will maximize individual interest with the expense of the public interest. Therefore, the potential dilemma o f collective action should be considered in future policy development. The failure of PPCs supports the previous research results in that smallholders are most competitive i n countries where people have low and slowly increasing incomes (Staal, 2001 ). This study also answered McDermott et al. (2010) question about whether the markets would continue to provide growth opportunities for smallholders in the long run as income growth and urbanization increases consumer demand for food safety. The case of PPC development in China has showed that it is very difficult for the small producers to Int. J. Poult. Sci., 13 (5): 292-298, 2014 Statistics Li., C., 2010. Challenges and response options in the government has limited capacities to work with millions of small producers to encourage them to follow the same production standards. The political commitment to control transmissible disease outbreaks was given higher priority than the commitment to small producer development since it was difficult for the government to balance the two. The failure of the PPC model caused the government to give up the efforts to support the development of the small producers in the poultry sector with the conclusion that the small producers are not suitable for standard and large scale production. Therefore, the government turned to support the large producers to reduce the cost of oversight and supervision of disease control. Predictably, this has forced more and more small producers out of the sector.
